Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights and the Complicated Dynamics of Domestic Violence: Some Thoughts Inspired by Myrna Raeder by Orenstein, Aviva A.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2015
Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights and the
Complicated Dynamics of Domestic Violence:
Some Thoughts Inspired by Myrna Raeder
Aviva A. Orenstein
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, aorenste@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Family Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Orenstein, Aviva A., "Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights and the Complicated Dynamics of Domestic Violence: Some Thoughts
Inspired by Myrna Raeder" (2015). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 1876.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1876
[MACRO] ORENSTEIN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/2/2015 2:47 PM 
 
466 
FORFEITURE OF CONFRONTATION 
RIGHTS AND THE COMPLICATED 
DYNAMICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: 




Myrna was a great friend and a great scholar.  What I admired most about 
her was the way she integrated her devotion to intellectual rigor with her 
commitment to justice.  Both personally and in her scholarship, Myrna was 
constantly concerned with the less fortunate, those people, such as battered 
women or children of prisoners, who tend to be overlooked in standard legal 
analysis. But she was not an ideologue.  Married to her desire for justice was 
Myrna’s careful argumentation, intellectual integrity, and thoughtfulness.  
This approach was an important part of her legacy to me and others in the 
academy; it was most apparent when two treasured values came into conflict. 
Such a conflict arises when a victim of domestic violence does not testify 
but the prosecution wishes to use her statement against the accused. We must 
balance the importance of prosecuting crimes of domestic violence, thereby 
holding batterers accountable, with the value of respecting the right of a 
criminal defendant to confront the witnesses against him.1  Specifically, 
under what circumstances can a prosecutor offer into evidence an out-of-
court statement by a victim of domestic violence, despite the victim’s absence 
 
 *  Aviva Orenstein is a Professor of Law and Val Nolan Fellow at the Indiana University 
Maurer School of Law.  Thanks to Southwestern School of Law for inviting me to participate in this 
wonderful symposium. Thanks to Brian Hamilton for his research assistance. And as always, thanks 
to my mother, Sylvia Orenstein, a retired public defender, appellate division, for her excellent 
editing and commentary on this piece. 
 1.  The right to confront witnesses comes from the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause 
to the United States Constitution.  It provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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and unavailability for cross-examination, on the grounds that the accused 
forfeited his confrontation right?2 
In 2004, in Crawford v. Washington,3 the Supreme Court changed the 
interpretation and the practical effect of the Confrontation Clause.  
Overruling twenty-five years of prevailing precedent, Crawford held that for 
a “testimonial statement” to be offered against the accused, the declarant 
must be available for confrontation, or if unavailable, subject to cross at some 
previous time.4 
The practical effect of Crawford was to exclude many out-of-court 
statements against the accused that had until then been readily admitted under 
Ohio v. Roberts,5 which allowed statements that fell within firmly rooted 
hearsay exceptions or that were particularly trustworthy to pass 
Confrontation Clause muster.6  Nowhere was the effect of Crawford more 
striking than in domestic violence cases,7 where victims often recant or refuse 
to testify.8  Before Crawford, prosecutors had routinely relied on domestic 
 
 2.  As will be evident throughout, Myrna was both prolific and insightful on the intersection 
of confrontation and domestic violence.  See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Thoughts about Giles and 
Forfeiture in Domestic Violence Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1329 (2010). 
 3.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 4.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (“In Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004), we held that this provision bars ‘admission of testimonial statements of a 
witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had 
a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’”). Crawford’s reference to evidence that was subject to 
cross-examination previously essentially ensured that evidence admitted under the former testimony 
hearsay exception would not violate the Confrontation Clause because the former testimony 
exception only admits evidence where the declarant was unavailable but had been cross examined 
in another hearing or proceeding.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.  The reach of Crawford and its 
progeny transcends the interpretation of confrontation and has served as the vehicle for exploring 
theories of originalism interpretation and consideration of the role of policy in constitutional 
interpretation.   
 5.  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004). 
 6.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-69 (describing, criticizing, and overruling Roberts). 
 7.  See Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse and Trustworthiness Exceptions 
after Crawford, 20 CRIM. JUST. 24, 24 (2005-06) (“Crawford’s fallout is being felt throughout the 
criminal justice system, but it has had a unique impact on domestic violence, child abuse, and elder 
abuse cases where absent victims and witnesses had become commonplace.”).   
 8.  By some calculations, as many as 80 percent of domestic violence victims recant their 
accusations at some point or simply refuse to testify. See Celeste E. Byrom, The Use of the Excited 
Utterance Hearsay Exception in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases After Crawford v. 
Washington, 24 REV. LITIG. 409, 410 (2005) (citing EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 194 (3d ed. 2002)).  Myrna Raeder, 
Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child 
Abuse, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 329 (2005) (“It became obvious relatively quickly in the fight 
against domestic violence that the major impediment to obtaining convictions was that the majority 
of battered women did not want to testify.  Even when they appeared at trial, they often recanted 
their accusations and generally were bad witnesses, resulting in relatively few convictions.”). 
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violence victims’ excited utterances to admit the hearsay, which by definition 
passed the toothless confrontation test of Roberts. After Crawford, those 
statements, often the crux of the evidence (because police officers arrived 
after the violence had been inflicted and could not testify to the occurrence 
based on their personal knowledge), raise Confrontation Clause concerns. 
Scholars generally agree that abandoning the ineffective approach of 
Roberts, which merely collapsed the constitutional standard into the hearsay 
rule, was a good idea.  However, there is much more debate about the wisdom 
and utility of the Court’s focus on “testimonial statements,” a category that 
has presented some serious interpretive difficulties.9  Most of the confusion 
and the subsequent Supreme Court opinions applying (one could not 
rightfully say clarifying) Crawford entailed trying to distinguish testimonial 
versus non-testimonial statements.  The distinction is crucial because, as it is 
now clear, the Confrontation Clause only applies to testimonial statements10 
– whatever those are.  Because we need some working definition, I propose 
that we follow the suggestion of the National Association of Criminal 
Defense lawyers, cited in Crawford, that testimonial statements are those 
“statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial.”11  The Court explained that “at a minimum” the 
definition includes “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand 
jury, or at a former trial; and . . . police interrogations.”12 
Cases exploring the definition of “testimonial statements” fall into two 
distinct categories.  The first category includes cases of violence and mayhem 
(only one of which, the most recent, does not involve an assaulted woman).13  
The second category involves forensic laboratory reports, for example, 
statements by a lab concerning whether the white powder found on the 
 
 9.   In a series of narrow decisions that ducked difficult questions, see, e.g., Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 
‘testimonial’”), the Court has bequeathed confusion and illogical distinctions for the lower courts 
to puzzle out.   
 10.  See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause has no 
application to [nontestimonial] statements and therefore permits their admission even if they lack 
indicia of reliability.”); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1153 (2011) (“We . . . limited the 
Confrontation Clause’s reach to testimonial statements.”). 
 11.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
 12.  Id. at 68. 
 13.  See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1143 (involving the identification of a shooter by his dying 
victim).  Although Crawford itself did not involve domestic violence, it concerned an attempt by 
the accused to punish the victim for an attempted sexual attack on the accused’s wife.  The first line 
of the Crawford opinion reads: “Petitioner Michael Crawford stabbed a man who allegedly tried to 
rape his wife, Sylvia.”  541 U.S. at 38. 
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accused was cocaine.14  The lab analysis cases considered whether such 
reports are testimonial and if so, who in the process of generating such reports 
must be made available for cross-examination.15  Remarkably, an odd 
combination of hysterical females and non-emotional, hyper-rational science 
techies constitute the out-of-court declarants who have provided the factual 
underpinnings for the Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
Two of the earliest and most important cases deciding what statements 
counted as “testimonial” involved domestic violence.  The companion cases 
of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana16 decided in 2006, two years 
after Crawford, both concerned domestic violence victims who made 
statements to police at the scene of their beating.  The issue in both cases was 
whether the victims’ out-of-court statements constituted testimonial 
statements for confrontation purposes.17   The Court concluded that in Davis, 
the victim’s statements were nontestimonial because the threat of violence 
was still ongoing and “circumstances objectively indicat[ed] that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation [was] to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency.”18  By contrast, in Hammon, the majority concluded that 
the victim’s statements were testimonial (and hence inadmissible) because 
there was “no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation [was] to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution.”19 
Because the focus here is on forfeiture, an exception to confrontation, 
rather than on the rule of when confrontation applies, I need not consider 
Davis and Hammon in detail.  The cases are relevant to this analysis, 
however, in one important respect: they serve as cultural artifacts that provide 
insight into the Court’s attitude towards domestic violence. Elsewhere, I and 
others have criticized the Court’s facile dualism between seeking safety (a 
nontestimonial purpose) and reporting a crime (a quintessential testimonial 
purpose) in the domestic violence arena where reporting a crime may be the 
only way to seek safety and the threat is ongoing.20   I will raise a similar 
 
 14.  See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 15.  See generally, Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and Forensic Laboratory Reports, 45 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 51 (2012) (discussing the lab report cases). 
 16.  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (decided concurrently with Hammon v. 
Indiana, 546 U.S. 976 (2005)). 
 17.  Id. at 817. 
 18.  Id. at 822, 828. 
 19.  Id. at 822, 829. 
 20.  See Aviva Orenstein, Sex Threats and Absent Victims: The Lessons of Regina v. 
Bedingfield for Modern Confrontation and Domestic Violence, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 115, 115 
(2010); Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach to the Right of Confrontation and Its Loss, 
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concern about understanding and respecting women’s experiences regarding 
forfeiture. 
From the initial rollout of its new approach to confrontation, the Court 
indicated that two possible exceptions existed to the Crawford rule, both of 
which emanated from the common law at the time the Sixth Amendment was 
written.  The first exception is the dying declaration, a vehicle for admitting 
evidence from absent declarants that the founders themselves recognized.21  
Testimonial dying declarations, such as those made by the dying victim to 
interrogators provided solely to convict the perpetrator, would be admissible 
even though the victim was never available for cross examination concerning 
her statements – a clear violation of the rule set out in Crawford.22  The 
Supreme Court has never actually heard a dying declaration case, but has, in 
increasingly forceful dicta,23 indicated that it is a “sui generis”24 exception to 
its confrontation rule. 
Similarly, an accused can forfeit confrontation rights by rendering a 
witness unavailable.  Reynolds v. United States25 involved an alleged 
bigamist who before his trial sent his (alleged) second wife away so that she 
could not testify against him.26  The Court affirmed that as a matter of equity 
and respect for the trial process, a criminal defendant who makes a witness 
unavailable cannot later be heard to complain that he cannot confront her in 
court.27  In dicta, Crawford indicated that forfeiture remains a viable 
exception to confrontation,28 and in 2008, the Supreme Court decided Giles 
 
15 J.L. & POL’Y 725, 726 (2007) (arguing that the Court’s understanding of domestic violence is 
“sufficiently inaccurate as to fatally undermine the coherence of both doctrine and theory”). 
 21.  The dying declaration requires that: (1) the declarant is unavailable (usually this is satisfied 
because the declarant actually did die); (2) the declarant had a sincere belief in her impending death; 
and (3) the statement concerned the cause of death.  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).  It is available in 
homicide and civil cases only.  Id. 
 22.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
 23.  Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008) (“We have previously acknowledged that 
two forms of testimonial statements were admitted at common law even though they were 
unconfronted. The first of these were declarations made by a speaker who was both on the brink of 
death and aware that he was dying.”) (citations omitted). 
 24.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36 n.6. 
 25.  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879) (“The Constitution does not guarantee 
an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts. It grants him the 
privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the 
witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege.”). 
 26.  Id. at 160. 
 27.  Id. at 158. 
 28.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (“[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) 
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an 
alternative means of determining reliability.”).  
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v. California,29 which confirmed that forfeiture did indeed constitute an 
exception to confrontation. The central issue in Giles, however, concerned 
intent.30  The Court held that to qualify for the exception of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing, the prosecution must show not only that the accused made the 
witness unavailable, but must also prove that the accused “intended to 
prevent a witness from testifying.”31  Mere knowledge of the consequences 
of the accused’s actions would not suffice to trigger forfeiture; otherwise, 
every voluntary homicide would also by necessity become a forfeiture case. 
In Giles, the accused shot his unarmed ex-girlfriend, Brenda Avie, six 
times before fleeing the scene.32  Despite a shot that appeared to be a 
defensive hand wound and one that appeared to have entered her back after 
she was already on the ground, at the murder trial Giles testified that he killed 
Avie in self-defense.33  To rebut charges of Avie’s aggression, prosecutors 
introduced evidence that three weeks before her death, Avie had made a 
tearful, frightened complaint to the police at the stationhouse that Giles had 
injured her and threatened her life.34  Because Giles killed Avie out of anger 
and not to prevent her testimony (no charges were pending), the majority 
deemed Avie’s prior out-of-court statement to police inadmissible.35  Her 
statements were testimonial and did not fall under the forfeiture exception.36 
In advocating a subjective intent requirement for forfeiture, Justice 
Scalia chided the dissent for making the practical point that an intent 
requirement would exclude vital evidence in domestic violence cases and, in 
fact, create a perverse incentive to kill a partner, rather than just injure her.37  
Justice Scalia distanced himself from and indeed mocked what he saw as 
identity politics, writing: 
 
 29.  Giles, 554 U.S. at 353. 
 30.  Id. at 359-60. 
 31.  Id. at 361-62. 
 32.  Id. at 356. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 356-57. 
 35.  Id. at 358, 377. 
 36.  Avie’s statements to police did not fall under the dying declaration because she made them 
without consciousness of imminent death.  See generally Aviva Orenstein, Her Last Words: Dying 
Declarations and Modern Confrontation Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141. 
 37.  See Giles, 554 U.S. at 365.  Breyer criticizes the majority’s approach, which “both creates 
evidentiary anomalies and aggravates existing evidentiary incongruities. Contrast (1) the defendant 
who assaults his wife and subsequently threatens her with harm if she testifies, with (2) the 
defendant who assaults his wife and subsequently murders her in a fit of rage. Under the majority’s 
interpretation, the former (whose threats make clear that his purpose was to prevent his wife from 
testifying) cannot benefit from his wrong, but the latter (who has committed what is undoubtedly 
the greater wrong) can. This is anomalous, particularly in this context where an equitable rule 
applies.”  554 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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The dissent closes by pointing out that a forfeiture rule which ignores 
Crawford would be particularly helpful to women in abusive relationships-
or at least particularly helpful in punishing their abusers . . . [W]e are 
puzzled by the dissent’s decision to devote its peroration to domestic abuse 
cases. Is the suggestion that we should have one Confrontation Clause (the 
one the Framers adopted and Crawford described) for all other crimes, but 
a special, improvised, Confrontation Clause for those crimes that are 
frequently directed against women?38 
Hectoring tone aside, Justice Scalia, in addition to dismissing the 
relevance of the real-world effects of his rulings,39 expressed antipathy for 
any special rule in the domestic-violence context.  Justice Scalia did, 
however, note one potential important factor about domestic violence cases, 
observing: 
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim from 
resorting to outside help, and include conduct designed to prevent testimony 
to police officers or cooperation in criminal prosecutions .  .  . Earlier abuse, 
or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from resorting to outside 
help would be highly relevant to this inquiry, as would evidence of ongoing 
criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been expected to 
testify.40 
Although Justice Scalia rejected what he saw as the dissent’s championing of 
special rules for the ladies, he did concede that a violent family dynamic 
might indeed shed light on whether a chronic abuser rendered the victim-
witness unavailable. 
Justice Souter, who concurred in the judgment, providing a crucial fifth 
vote in the 5-4 Giles decision, added an even more direct statement that, 
though the forfeiture rules are the same for all types of cases, applying the 
intent requirement would be easy in domestic violence cases.41  Justice Souter 
wrote that there was no 
reason to doubt that the element of intention would normally be satisfied by 
the intent inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in the classic abusive 
relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from outside help, 
including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process. If the 
 
 38.   Id. at 376 (majority opinion). 
 39.  Justice Scalia has proven stubbornly disinterested in the practical effects of his Crawford 
jurisprudence.  This fact is notable in the lab analysis cases where Scalia has rejected arguments 
about the impractical and essentially hollow burden Crawford places on the state.  Melendez-Diaz 
v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 325 (2008) (“The Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution 
of criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and the privilege 
against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause—like those other constitutional provisions—
is binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience.”). 
 40.  Giles, 544 U.S. at 377. 
 41.  Id. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring in part). 
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evidence for admissibility shows a continuing relationship of this sort, it 
would make no sense to suggest that the oppressing defendant miraculously 
abandoned the dynamics of abuse the instant before he killed his victim, say 
in a fit of anger.42 
The context of domestic violence complicates the Court’s analysis in two 
specific ways.  First, as with most forfeiture cases in the domestic violence 
context, the witness is also the victim.  Unlike a witness who unluckily 
happened to stumble upon a mafia hit in progress, the witness is herself the 
one who was the target of the criminal behavior.  Second, it is not just a 
random person who perpetrated the crime against the witness, but an intimate 
partner, often someone whom the witness loves or once loved.  The accused 
and the victim-witness know each other well and, based on their prior history 
and perhaps even current intimacy, can engage in subtle forms of 
communication without necessarily resorting to explicit threats, bribes, or 
promises.  How does the fact of an abusive relationship inform the 
application of the intent requirement? 
Professor Tom Lininger suggests taking Scalia up on what Lininger 
deems Scalia’s invitation to think about how forfeiture might work in 
domestic violence cases.43  In a thought-provoking, practical, and savvy 
article, Lininger, a former prosecutor, proposes per se rules.44  He advocates 
that courts should find the requisite intent where the defendant has done any 
of the following: violated a restraining order; committed any act of violence 
while judicial proceedings are pending; or engaged in a prolonged pattern of 
abusing and isolating the victim.45 In providing this jurisprudential 
framework Lininger hopes to “allow trial courts to apply Giles faithfully” 
while still accounting for the special circumstances of a witness reporting 
violence received at the hands of her intimate partner.46 
How have trial and appellate courts interpreted Giles and applied it in 
domestic violence cases?  Have they quoted Justice’s Souter’s language or 
adopted Professor Lininger’s per se standard?  In attempting to figure out the 
legacy of Giles, I searched post-Giles case law, both federal and state. 
In reviewing the case law, I made one additional distinction, setting aside 
the cases that, like Giles, ended in the death of the victim.  So far unremarked 
 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their 
Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857 (2009).  
 44.  Id. at 865. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id.; see also Donald A. Dripps, Controlling the Damage Done by Crawford v. Washington: 
Three Constructive Proposals, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521 (2010) (suggesting a rebuttable 
presumption that an otherwise unexplained unavailability of a witness previously injured or 
threatened by the accused is the result of improper pressure brought by the defendant).  
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is the additional wrinkle presented in Giles that complicates the forfeiture 
analysis: Giles falls within the gruesome subset of domestic violence cases 
that result in femicide.  Because Giles killed his girlfriend, she was, by 
definition, unavailable to testify, and a per se rule arguably makes a lot of 
sense.  In this essay I focus on cases where the witness was alive and refused 
to testify.47  This distinction complicates the analysis prompting us to wonder 
whether we should also consider the motives of the absent witness, in 
addition to the motives of  the criminal defendant who made her 
unavailable.48 
In looking at the post-Giles domestic violence prosecutions that raised 
the issue of forfeiture, but did not involve the death of the witness, I found, 
unsurprisingly, that courts have employed many procedural mechanisms to 
duck the forfeiture questions entirely.  For instance, Courts elide an analysis 
of forfeiture if the accused failed to make a timely confrontation objection at 
the time the out-of court statements were introduced.49  Even if objected to, 
courts often determine that, given the other strong evidence in the case, 
admission of the unconfronted statements constituted harmless error.50  Many 
of the cases challenging forfeiture arose on habeas.  Giles, however, does not 
apply retroactively because the absence of an intent requirement for forfeiture 
does not meet the habeas standard of violating a clear constitutional rule 
announced by the Supreme Court.51 
 
 47.  In terms of intent in cases of femicide, either the accused killed the witness to prevent her 
for appearing at another hearing (such as another incident of battery, or even something unrelated, 
such as a custody matter), or he began beating the victim and realized that she would tell police and 
needed to silence her entirely, so he decided in the course of the beating to kill her.  See People v. 
Zumot, No. BB943863, 2013 WL 6507459, at *10  (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2013) (“[F]orfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine applies when a defendant purposely kills a witness to prevent the witness from 
reporting the defendant’s conduct to the police.”).  
 48.  Special interpretive questions abound in femicide case, including whether there must be 
an “ongoing matter” at the time of the forfeiture and whether making the witness unavailable must 
be the accused’s primary purpose in killing her. See Oregon v. Supanchick, 323 P.3d 231 (Or. 2014).  
 49.  See, e.g., State v. Thaves, 175 Wash. App. 1012 (2013) (noting that on appeal defendant 
did not challenge the lower court’s finding that the victim’s statements were properly admitted under 
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing).  
 50.  See, e.g., State v. Carr, 331 P.3d 544, 644 (Kan. 2014) (“We need not settle this dispute 
because we are persuaded that answering the question of whether any error on this [forfeiture] issue 
was harmless is dispositive.”); State v. Lahai, 18 A.3d 630 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (noting that the 
State had met its harmless-error burden); State v. Ivey, 427 S.W.3d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) 
(choosing to not resolve the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing issue because even if admission of 
testimonial statements were error, the defendant cannot show manifest miscarriage of justice if the 
error went uncorrected).   
 51.  A federal court can only grant an application for writ of habeas corpus if the original 
adjudication of the claim: (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States;” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 
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Courts also adopt substantive alternatives to forfeiture.  For instance, 
courts will not reach prosecutors’ forfeiture arguments because they accept 
the alternative argument that the statement was nontestimonial and therefore 
the confrontation right did not apply in the first place.52 
In other cases, the Giles intent requirement for forfeiture is so easily met 
that there is nothing of doctrinal interest (though the human interest 
abounds).53  In some of these cases, where the accused is as stupid as he is 
malicious, the prosecution introduces unassailable evidence of direct, violent 
threats to the victim transmitted during conversations on the jailhouse phone, 
which were, of course, recorded. 54  Although the contents of those 
conversations are chilling, they pose no interpretive issues and the fact of 
domestic violence does not influence the inquiry regarding the obvious intent 
of the criminal defendant to make the witness unavailable. 
I found and will consider here a few truly fascinating post-Giles cases 
that raise important and nuanced questions about how to apply forfeiture in 
 
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 
(2012); see Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24–26 (2002). The Supreme Court held that 
Crawford is not retroactive. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007). Lower courts have held 
that Giles is not either. See, e.g., Ponce v. Felker, 606 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2010); Hand v. Houk, No. 
2:07–cv–846, 2013 WL 2372180, at *18 (S.D. Ohio May 29, 2013).  
 52.  See, e.g., People v. Racz, No. B203267, 2010 WL 3387145 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2010) 
(holding that murdered wife’s statements were nontestimonial and thus confrontation did not apply 
and the forfeiture issue was moot); People v. Corpuz, No. A121199, 2011 WL 2412379 (Cal. Ct. 
App. June 16, 2011) (holding wife’s phone call to police during a beating was nontestimonial and 
any admission of her statements constituted harmless error); People v. Robles, 302 P.3d 269 (Colo. 
App. 2011) (holding victim’s statements to friends and neighbors were nontestimonial and therefore 
only excludable, if at all, by hearsay rules); State v. Shackelford, 247 P.3d 582 (Idaho 2010) (holding 
victim ex-wife’s statements were admissible because they were nontestimonial and therefore did 
not violate defendant’s confrontation rights).  
 53.  See, e.g., State v. Dobbs, 320 P.3d 705, 706 (Wash. 2014) (noting that accused “engaged 
in a campaign of threats, harassment, and intimidation against his ex-girlfriend, C.R., that included 
a drive-by shooting at her home and warnings that she would ‘get it’  for calling the police and she 
would ‘regret it’ if she pressed charges against him.”). 
 54.  See, e.g., People v. Jones, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571 (Ct. App. 2012). Sometimes the threats 
are to the economic security of the victim or to the safety of her children. See People v. Sanchez, 
No. B246573, 2014 WL 3842889, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2014) (“[T]here was substantial 
evidence appellant was engaged in repeated attempts to prevent Gonzalez from testifying, involving 
discussions of money and even potential harm to her children.”).  Sometimes both love and threats 
are mingled together.  See, e.g., People v. Smart, 989 N.Y.S.3d 631, 634 (N.Y. 2014) (accused 
threatened on jailhouse telephone that if his girlfriend testified against him in a robbery case he 
would “wring” her “fucking neck” but also presented her failure to appear in court as an act of love). 
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the domestic violence context.55  In Commonwealth v. Szerlong,56 the accused 
allegedly entered his girlfriend’s home, grabbed her by the throat while she 
was asleep, and held a knife to her throat.57 The victim (who remained 
unnamed in the opinion) did not report the incident; her sister did, against the 
victim’s express wishes.58  The prosecutor moved in limine to admit hearsay 
statements made by the victim to the police.59 When the prosecution 
attempted to call the victim-witness to testify at a dangerousness hearing, she 
refused on the grounds of spousal privilege.60  After the assault, but before 
the trial, the victim married Szerlong.61  The question before the court was 
whether by marrying the victim-witness, Szerlong intended to make her 
unavailable to testify against him.62  The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts concluded that he did and affirmed the conviction, which 
admitted the victim-witness’ testimonial statements under the forfeiture 
doctrine.63 
In the prosecutor’s motion in limine in Szerlong, the government cited 
evidence from the victim’s best friend that the victim explained to her “that 
marriage was the only way that she would not have to testify” against 
 
 55.  Cases involving child molestation present another difficult interpretative question. When 
the molester, as he abuses his victim, warns the child not to tell, is he also triggering forfeiture? See 
People v. Burns, 832 N.W.2d 738 (Mich. 2013) (not reaching the constitutional question and 
holding that abuser’s warnings to child not to tell of sexual contact did not satisfy the Michigan 
hearsay exception for forfeiture by wrongdoing); Thomas D. Lyon & Julia Dente, Child Witnesses 
and the Confrontation Clause, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1181, 1181 (2012) (proposing a 
“forfeiture by exploitation” approach in cases of child abuse whereby “courts should hold that 
defendants have forfeited their confrontation rights if they exploited a child’s vulnerabilities such 
that they could reasonably anticipate that the child would be unavailable to testify.”).  
 56.  Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 933 N.E.2d 633 (Mass. 2010). 
 57.  Id. at 637. 
 58.  Id. at 640. 
 59.  Id. at 637. 
 60.  Id. Massachusetts recognizes a spousal testimonial privilege owned by the (would be) 
testifying spouse. Massachusetts Guide to Evidence 504(a) provides that “[a] spouse shall not be 
compelled to testify in the trial of an indictment, complaint, or other criminal proceeding brought 
against the other spouse” and that “[o]nly the witness-spouse may claim the privilege. It does not 
apply in civil proceedings, or in any prosecution for nonsupport, desertion, neglect of parental duty, 
or child abuse, including incest.  Traditionally, spousal privilege was owned by the accused spouse 
(the husband) who could force his wife to stand by her man.  This ancient privilege derives from 
the unity of marriage (whereby the legal identity of the wife merged into the husband’s); since the 
witness would not be forced to testify against himself, and legally, his wife was part of himself, she 
could not testify either.  A more modern approach maintains the spousal testimonial privilege but 
renders it gender neutral and places the choice whether to testify into the hands of the spouse being 
asked to testify. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). 
 61.  Szerlong, 933 N.E.2d at 637. 
 62.  Id. at 641. 
 63.  Id. at 638. 
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Szerlong.64 The victim told her friend that “she had discussed the matter with 
the defendant and they had decided to marry because they knew that, if they 
were married, she would not have to testify against him.”65  Similarly, the 
victim’s sister was prepared to testify that when she reported the violent 
incident to the police, approximately one week after the violence had 
occurred, she “knew of no plans for the victim and the defendant to marry.”66  
The victim did not tell her family that she and Szerlong had married, and only 
informed her sister so that she would not be surprised when the victim 
invoked the spousal privilege in open court at the accused’s trial.67 
I have deep concerns about the use of forfeiture in Szerlong.  Perhaps the 
marriage was merely a sham and, as the prosecution argued, the accused only 
married the victim-witness to prevent her from testifying.  If the accused 
threatened the victim-witness with more violence if she did not marry him, 
then such a forced marriage, like the forced exile in Reynolds, 185 years 
earlier, would certainly constitute forfeiture.  But nothing in the facts of 
Szerlong indicate that the victim was intimidated into marrying her batterer.  
It looks more like a choice made out of misguided loyalty and unhealthy 
attachment than force or duress.  Alternatively, perhaps she wanted to marry 
him all along and the prospect of testimony prompted Szerlong’s proposal. 
How can the law address the uncertain sway of emotional blackmail and 
appeals to love?  This question has arisen twice recently in New York trial 
courts.  In  People v. Smith,68  a Kings County court applied forfeiture when 
defendant had violated a court no-contact order, and called his girlfriend, the 
victim-witness, over 300 times from jail, even though the prosecution could 
present no evidence that Smith had threatened her with any harm.  The court 
explained that “[t]he power, control, domination and coercion exercised in 
abusive relationships can be expressed in terms of violence certainly, but [is] 
just as real in repeated calls sounding expressions of love and concern.”69  It 
further noted: “Orders of protection are therefore issued by courts as much to 
prevent assaults on the psyche of a vulnerable victim as to prevent assaults 
on her person.”70 Two years later, in People v. Turnquest71 the court, citing 
Smith (but oddly not mentioning Giles), held that the accused forfeited his 
right to confront the statements of his wife, the victim-witness at his trial for 
 
 64.  Id. at 640. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id.   
 68.  People v. Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d 860 (App. Div. 2010). 
 69.  Id. at 861. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  People v. Turnquest, 938 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. 2012). 
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assaulting her, including pushing her out of a moving vehicle.72  The court 
found that the evidence demonstrated “quite convincingly that defendant’s 
misconduct—his two surprise visits to Ms. Turnquest’s home, his barrage of 
telephone calls to Ms. Turnquest, and his use of various third parties to 
contact Ms. Turnquest, all in violation of the extant orders of protection—
caused the once completely cooperative complainant to become 
unavailable.”73 Ms. Turnquest was actually willing to testify, but she planned 
to recant her statements to police, saying that she voluntarily jumped from 
the car going forty miles per hour.74  Through third parties, the accused tried 
to “get Ms. Turnquest to prepare a document or ‘affidavit’ that defendant 
intended to then submit to the ‘judge’ to get the charges ‘tossed’ out.”75  
Notably both Smith and Turnquest involved breaches of a protective order, 
one of Lininger’s three criteria for per se forfeiture.76 
Similarly, in Garcia v. State,77 a Texas Court of Appeals affirmed 
forfeiture, despite the Garcia’s arguments (conceded by the State during 
trial), that he made no direct threats to his girlfriend, Cooper, to prevent her 
testimony.78  Cooper had been assaulted, bound, choked, gagged with a 
plastic bottle and hit in the back of her head.79  At the time of the beating, 
Cooper exhibited fear of Garcia and great reluctance to report the incident.80  
Garcia (who kept on encouraging Cooper to deal with his attorney and not 
the prosecutor or police)81 never issued any threats.  Instead Garcia told 
Cooper, “Do whatever you have to do,” and warned her not to trust the 
 
 72.  Id. at 752, 762. 
 73.  Id. at 760. 
 74.  Id. at 754. 
 75.  Id. at 761. 
 76.  Applying Professor Lininger’s approach, I find treating a history of domestic violence as 
per se forfeiture even in the absence of actual threats or coercion both interesting and troubling. 
Violation of a protective order seems to me the best case for per se application of forfeiture because 
it demonstrates that accused would be willing to break the law.  Again, however, a breach to 
apologize or to check on the welfare of their children is different from a threat or leaving disturbing 
messages on the witness’s phone. 
 77.  Garcia v. State, No. 03-11-00403-CR, 2012 WL 3795447, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 
2012). 
 78.  Id. at *10-11. 
 79.  Id. at *2. 
 80.  Id. at *2-3. 
 81.  Id. at *10.  “In a letter written to Cooper in March 2011, approximately two months before 
his trial was scheduled to begin, Garcia discussed the charges pending against him: 
I’ve done my part. Now all that’s left is for you to do yours. You make sure you do everything 
through my lawyer and not through your lawyer or the D.A. She will advise you on everything. 
So once again do everything through my lawyer ( [name of defense counsel], my criminal 
lawyer). F**k what your lawyer or the D.A. has to say. If they try and threaten you with 
anything. You run to and talk about it with my lawyer.”  
Id. 
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prosecutors because they will “twist your words.”82 Garcia reminded her that 
“what you do can affect my life.”83 In discussing the upcoming trial, Garcia 
told her, “I just need to know where you stand; you don’t need to go at all” 
and informed her that he was “pretty anxious about the trial.”84 Garcia also 
told Cooper that their life together would be different based on whether he 
“gets out soon” or “gets out later.”85 In their final conversation before trial, 
Garcia asked Cooper about her thoughts regarding the prosecutors, telling 
Cooper, “They’re out to screw us,” and, “I’m trying to shield you from . . . 
these people.”86 The court, citing Justice Souter’s concurrence in Giles, 
concluded that Garcia, through his persistent contact via mail and jailhouse 
phone calls, persuaded Cooper to fail to appear in court to testify, even though 
he did not directly threaten her.87  In this case, although I would reject a per 
se finding of forfeiture, the facts support that Garcia, having issued threats in 
the past was, per his attorney’s coaching, carefully issuing his threats in code. 
This is different from an appeal to love. 
The harder question is whether asking for the victim to preserve a 
relationship or requesting a victim’s hand in marriage should always 
constitute forfeiture.  Is there any room for love and forgiveness so that a 
victim might choose to marry her one-time abuser and might of her own 
independent volition choose not to testify?  If we treat all victims of domestic 
violence who refuse to testify as necessarily intimidated, we deny their 
agency and experience.  By ignoring her sincere wishes, the law in some 
cases may be complicit in the power dynamic that belittles and silences 
victims of domestic violence.88 
The facts of Szerlong underscore that the sole focus in forfeiture doctrine 
is on the behavior of the accused, and not the experience and choices of the 
witness. This focus on the accused makes sense given that the central 
question of forfeiture revolves around the equity of preventing the accused 
from benefiting from his bad behavior that rendered the witness unavailable.  
But solely looking at the accused’s behavior and intent is also undesirable 
because it gives no value, credence, or even consideration to the behavior, 
intent, voice, and personhood of the victim-witness.  No one inquires what 
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at *9-11. 
 88.  Cf. Tamara L. Kuennen, Love Matters, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 979 (2014) (“Although 
feminist legal scholars have unearthed the many rational reasons women experiencing abuse may 
choose to preserve, rather than sever, their intimate relationships, we (feminist legal scholars) have 
ignored love as a reason for staying.”). 
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the witness-victim actually desires.  Instead, her identity is reduced to her 
status as a battered woman, one who apparently does not know her own mind 
or act in her own best self-interest.  She is per se deemed a sap or a 
masochist.89  She does not realize that her marriage is a cruel joke. 
In cases of outright physical threats and intimidation, one has little 
trouble believing that analyzing the forfeiture question from the perspective 
of the accused and the perspective of the witness-victim will lead to the same 
result (though even in cases of violence, fear and love may mingle in a soup 
of emotions).  The case for forfeiture becomes murkier, however, where there 
is love, forgiveness, or concern about who will support the family in the 
batterer’s absence, and the accused has not acted to interfere directly with the 
witness’s right to testify.  What are the right questions to ask when a woman 
simply refuses to testify because she loves the man who assaulted her or she 
worries whether she and her kids can make it without him?  Certainly, jailing 
the woman as a material witness or holding her in contempt or otherwise 
coercing her testimony seems abusive, a point that Myrna herself raised.90  
The less intrusive approach, adopted in Szerlong, whereby the victim’s prior 
statements are admitted under a combination of hearsay exceptions and 
forfeiture, is also problematic and echoes some old debates. 
As noted above, before Crawford, the prior statements of a witness-
victim were routinely admitted without the victim’s testimony because such 
statements satisfied a firmly-rooted hearsay exception (usually the excited 
utterance) and then, by definition satisfied the Confrontation Clause under 
Roberts.91  Scholars debated whether trying such victim-absent cases92 was 
in the best interests of women.93  In some respects, the issue is more pointed 
and poignant when considering forfeiture.  Pre-Crawford prosecutors with 
non-drop policies simply did not care what the victim thought, and 
determined, as keepers of the peace if not paternalistic know-it-alls, that 
prosecuting the batterer was essential.  However, in the area of forfeiture, 
when a battered woman claims it is her own independent decision not to 
testify because she loves the accused, we essentially tell her that she is 
experiencing a false emotion and that, really, she has been intimidated and 
 
 89.  Id. at 991-92 (“Women experiencing abuse are considered blameworthy or masochistic 
when they want to preserve their intimate relationships. Particularly when their desire is based, even 
partially, on love, it is viewed as maladaptive and even pathological.”). 
 90.  Raeder, supra note 8, at 328-29 (noting that women who refuse to testify have faced threats 
of imprisonment and criminal charges for child endangerment; some women have been jailed as 
material witnesses). 
 91.  Id. at 328. 
 92.  These were sometimes called “evidence based” or “victimless” prosecutions.  See Raeder, 
supra note 7, at 24, in which Raeder aptly termed it “the witness lite/hearsay heavy approach.” Id. 
 93.  See Orenstein, supra note 20, at 145-47. 
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has not made a free choice even when there has been no threat of violence.  
The Court in Szerlong essentially announced to the victim-witness that her 
husband did not really love her and that his motive in marrying her was just 
to (or primarily to – this point is unclear) prevent her testimony.94 
From perspectives of safety and respect, legitimate and heart-wrenching 
questions persist about whether to press a domestic violence prosecution 
where the victim-witness adamantly does not want to testify or to send her 
man to jail.  Arguments in favor of respecting the victim’s wishes include the 
fact that the victim may be in the best position to evaluate her own safety, 
and that not testifying may be the safer choice for her and her children in the 
long run.95  Also, from a safety perspective, there is cause to worry about a 
system that uses statements made in emergencies against the accused (many 
of which will not be testimonial at all).  The victim’s willingness to call 911 
to stop the beating may be very different from her willingness to send the 
batterer to jail.  A policy of using the victim’s statement without her 
participation in the trial may simply result in fewer calls seeking help, even 
when the victim is in grave danger. Finally, even if prosecutors have a 
legitimate case against the accused, some women may not trust the efficacy 
or fairness of the justice system, nor wish to participate in it, particularly if 
the accused is a member of a minority group that tends to receive harsher 
sentences and is overrepresented in the prison population.96 
Aside from respecting the victim, other concerns arise about a broad 
application of forfeiture in the domestic violence context, particularly where 
the accused has not tried to dissuade the woman from testifying with violence 
or threats. We cannot dismiss the valid civil libertarian concern that the 
accused is deprived of cross-examining the statements of his accuser.  If 
courts adopt the per se rule that a history of intimate-partner violence equals 
forfeiture, there is no way to confront statements that are false or exaggerated.  
The accused’s status as a batterer and his past bad behavior forecloses a 
precious constitutional right. We must allow for the possibility that one 
reason a witness refuses to testify is that she does not stand by her original 
statement to police.  Although I doubt this happens often, we cannot construct 
a system that presumes alleged victims of domestic violence never lie. 
A categorical approach to domestic violence that treats all cases where 
there is an established history of violence as forfeiture can in some cases deny 
 
 94.  Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 933 N.E.2d 633, 641 (Mass. 2010). 
 95.  See Raeder, supra note 8, at 329 (“A few researchers concluded that the empirical evidence 
indicated that some classes of women were put at greater risk by aggressive prosecution, particularly 
in misdemeanor cases where defendants were released pretrial, or received probation or short 
sentences.”) (citations omitted). 
 96.  See Orenstein, supra note 20, at 144-45.  
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a woman her legitimate agency and deprive an accused of a fair trial.  I agree 
that the wheedling, cajoling, and contrition on the part of the accused may 
seem false and just appear to be part of the cycle of violence between the 
accused and the victim-witness, but I am not ready to say in the absence of 
threats or bribes (overt or coded) that an offer to marry constitutes forfeiture. 
My final question of course, is something I ask myself often in multiple 
contexts: What would Myrna do? First, Myrna drew a stark distinction 
between femicide cases and those where the victim-witness is alive and 
chooses not to testify.97  Second, from the very beginning of Crawford’s 
unfolding, because of her civil rights concerns, Myrna refused to expand 
forfeiture too broadly where the victim-witness was indeed available.  In 
2005 she wrote, presciently: “While forfeiture is likely to be a factor in a 
number of domestic violence cases, and prosecutors are correct to worry that 
the testimonial approach gives defendant more incentive to keep women from 
testifying, forfeiture cannot be assumed without specific evidence linking the 
defendant to the witness’s failure to testify in cases where the victim is alive, 
since there are so many potential reasons for her absence at trial.”98  In 
commenting on Giles, Myrna enlarged upon with this reasoning, writing: 
I have been more hesitant to substitute evidence of an abusive relationship 
as evidence of forfeiture without evidence of duress or bribe when the 
complainant is alive but refuses to testify, since  so many complexities about 
the relationship confound an automatic finding that the defendant is the 
cause of her unavailability. In other words, that approach ignores reasons as 
to her unavailability that cannot be attributed to acts of the defendant.99 
Finally, Myrna commented directly on Professor Lininger’s per se approach, 
which she “applauded”100 but did not fully endorse.  She observed that 
“[u]ndoubtedly, the three types of evidence that Professor Lininger suggests 
would be relevant to finding inferred intent,” but nevertheless rejected a “per 
se rules mandate,” in favor of a “rebuttable presumption.”101  Once the bright 
line approach of per se rules is rejected, we must, as Myrna indicated, wrestle 
with the hard cases where love and psychological influence, rather than force 
or bribes affect the witness-victim’s behavior. 
I do not know how Myrna would have come out in Szerlong or in the 
two New York cases where no force was used but instead the accused 
 
 97.  See Myrna S. Raeder, Being Heard After Giles: Comments on the Sound of Silence, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 105, 108-09 (“I have always distinguished murder from other domestic violence cases, 
and pre-Giles argued for simple forfeiture without intent in murder cases.”). 
 98.  Raeder, supra note 7, at 31-32.  
 99.  Raeder, supra note 2, at 1346. 
 100.  Raeder, supra note 97, at 109. 
 101.  Id. at 110-11. 
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resorted to cajoling and appeals to love.  On the one hand, Myrna was keenly 
aware of the dynamics of domestic violence that center on control, and could 
rightly see the behavior of the accused as part of intimate partner violence 
dynamic.  On the other hand, she was cautious about overextending forfeiture 
and denying the accused the right to confront the statement of witnesses who 
so love the accused they refuse to testify. Myrna modeled candor and 
compassion in her search for balance between the various rights involved.  
She wrote: “As a feminist who is also concerned about the defendant’s right 
to confrontation, I have long pondered the proper balance to ensure that the 
voices of women and children are heard, without eviscerating the ability of 
the defendant to confront live complainants, and not just second hand 
witnesses.”102 Although I do not know how Myrna would have resolved this 
tough and interesting question, I can say with certainty that I would have 




 102.  Raeder, supra note 8, at 313-14. 
